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With the “more economic approach” the EU is taking a new tack on merger control 
policy. This is visible not only in the new SIEC prohibition criterion and the criteria 
for appraising horizontal mergers but also in more recent decision-making 
practice. Greater legal certainty, on the one hand, and improved decision-making, 
on the other, have been cited as the aims of the (increased) use of industrial 
economics models and quantitative analysis. 
The objective of a (better) economic foundation in EU merger control is expressly 
welcomed. However, on closer analysis it is found that in point of fact the more 
economic approach in its present form creates less legal certainty, while the 
upshot in terms of the quality of the decision-making is at least unclear. At the 
same time, the (administrative) burden is likely to rise. Moreover, certain problems 
emerge for instance from the increasing involvement of economic experts or the 
possibilities for (industrial policy-related) political intervention.  
In conclusion, a broader perception of an economics-based approach which takes 
account especially of the instutional implications is called for. Specific recommend-
ations are the establishment of an independent competition authority and the 
stronger orientation of merger control to (more) general rules. 
Dipl.-Vw. Arndt Christiansen,  
Philipps-Universität Marburg, FB Wirtschaftswissenschaften,  
Abt. Wirtschaftspolitik (arndt.christiansen@staff.uni-marburg.de) 
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Introduction
The EU merger control regime is currently in the process of its most far-reaching reform since 
its introduction in 1990, central to which is the "more economic approach". This means the 
stronger focus on industrial economics models and quantitative methods of analysis, firstly in 
case investigations and, secondly, in formulating legislation and defining the criteria that are set. 
The new approach has had a tangible influence on the amended Merger Regulation (ECMR)
1 of 
May 2004 and the new Horizontal Merger Guidelines (HMG)
2 as well as on recent decision-
making.  Furthermore,  the  "more  economic  approach"  is  to  be  extended  to  other  areas  of 
competition policy such as the control of abusive practices under Article 82 of the EC Treaty 
and the control of state aid under Articles 86ff. of the EC Treaty (EACGP 2005; Monti 2004b; 
Röller 2005). This creates pressure for an adjustment of German competition policy as well 
(German Federal Cartel Office 2004; Hildebrand 2005; German Monopolies Commission 2005, 
Nos. 228ff.). 
Consequently,  it  is  imperative  that  the  advantages  and  drawbacks  associated  with  the  new 
approach should be analysed critically and in their full breadth. The European Commission itself 
initially cited greater legal certainty and, in the course of the reform process, improved decision-
making quality as the rationale for a stronger (industrial) economics-based approach. These aims 
are expressly welcomed, which is all the more reason to examine whether the "more economic 
approach" can meet these expectations. In the interest of a comprehensive review, account also 
needs to be taken of other aspects, namely the administrative burden and cost associated with 
the merger control process and the institutional implications. So far, insufficient consideration 
has been given to these aspects by the European Commission or in the academic discussion.
The paper is divided into four sections. The first section gives an overview of the new approach 
to EU merger control policy. The effects in terms of (administrative) cost, legal certainty and 
decision  quality  are  then  analysed  (Section  2).  Finally,  the  problems  associated  with  the 
increasing involvement of economic experts and the further reforms needed with regard to the 
institutional framework are discussed (Section 3). The paper then ends with a summary and 
conclusion in Section 4.
1 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, 
in: Official Journal of the European Union L 24, 29/01/2004, pp. 1-22.
2 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings, in: Official Journal of the European Union C 31, 05/02/2004, pp. 5-18.A. Christiansen The more economic approach in EU merger control 2
1. The new approach in EU merger control
1.1 Overview of the reform process
The merger control regime, which was only introduced in 1990, has since become a central 
instrument  of  EU  competition  policy  (Kerber 2000;  Levy 2003;  Murray 2004;  Pons/
Sautter 2004).  Until  the  recent  reform,  the  European  Commission's  Competition  Directorate 
General and, in particular, the special "Merger Task Force" have been responsible for reviewing 
cases. However, the final decisions are taken by the College of Commissioners. They are subject 
to judicial review by the Court of First Instance and, in the last instance, by the European Court 
of Justice.
The present sweeping reform process was initiated by the European Commission at the end of 
2001  with  the  presentation  of  its  Green  Paper
3  (Böge 2004;  Budzinski/Christiansen 2005a; 
Lyons 2004). It gathered further momentum in the course of 2002 with the (first) reversal of 
Commission  prohibition  decisions  by  the  Court  of  First  Instance  in  three  cases  (Airtours, 
Schneider Electric, Tetra Laval).
4 The court found fault, on an unprecedented scale, with the 
economic arguments as well as with the handling of the evidence. In response, the Commission 
put the soundness of its economic analysis more and more in the fore of the reform. Under the 
motto of a "more economic approach" it sought to give stronger consideration to new industrial 
economics models and quantitative methods of analysis. 
The  most  striking  change  in  the  amended  Merger  Regulation  of  May  2004  is  the  new 
prohibition  criterion  (Röller/Strohm 2005;  Zimmer 2004).  It  springs  from  a  political 
compromise reached between the representatives of the member states in the European Council. 
On the one hand, it constitutes a convergence with the Anglo-Saxon SLC ("substantial lessening 
of  competition")  test  and  is  intended  to  close  an  alleged  gap  with  regard  to  mergers  in 
heterogeneous  oligopolistic  markets.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  an  independent  (European) 
formulation.  Article 2 (3) ECMR  now  reads:  "A  concentration  which  would  significantly 
impede effective competition, in the common market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as 
a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, shall be declared incompatible 
with  the  common  market."  This  is  therefore  referred  to  as  the  prohibition  criterion  of 
"significant impediment to effective competition" (SIEC). Compared with the old formulation of 
3 Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, COM(2001) 745/6 final, 11/12/2001.
4  Case  T-342/99  –  Airtours  v  Commission,  06/06/2002;  Case  T-310/01  -  Schneider  Electric  v  Commission, 
22/10/2002; Case T-5/02 – Tetra Laval v Commission, 25/10/2002.A. Christiansen The more economic approach in EU merger control 3
Article 2 ECMR, the relation between the constituent elements has been reversed.
5 The previous 
criterion  of  market  dominance  is  still  embodied  in  the  rule,  but  it  now  only  constitutes  an 
example.  The  continued  validity  of  previous  case  law  as  "guidance"  is,  however,  expressly 
wished (ECMR, Reasoning No. 26). 
The  new  SIEC  test  is  given  concrete  form  in  the  Horizontal  Merger  Guidelines,  which  are 
intended  to  provide  "a  solid  economic  framework  for  the  assessment"  (ECMR,  Reasoning 
No. 28).  Hence,  the  aim  continues  to  be  the  prevention  of  (significantly  increased)  market 
power, which is understood to mean the ability of one or more firms to increase prices, to reduce 
output, choice or quality, or to diminish innovation at the expense of the consumer (Guidelines, 
paras 8f.).  The  Commission  thereby  compares,  within  the  framework  of  the  "competitive 
analysis in a particular case", the foreseeable impact of the merger with the situation which 
would have emerged without the merger (Guidelines, para 13). So the relevant issue is whether 
the merger to be reviewed can be expected with sufficient probability to have anti-competitive 
effects. While, at this level, the reform implies no fundamental change, the criteria set out in the 
Guidelines embody a number of new substantive aspects. Firstly, they include the application of 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
6 as a relevant structural feature to measure concentration 
levels in addition to market shares (Guidelines, paras 14ff.). Other points worth highlighting are 
the  comments  on  the  anti-competitive  effects  of  mergers  in  an  oligopolistic  setting  and  on 
efficiency gains (see 1.2 below). In addition, with buyer power, market entry and the "failing 
firm defense", consideration is now given to already established criteria which can act as a 
"countervailing factor" to counteract increased market power (Guidelines, paras 64ff.).
Furthermore, there are also a number of important procedural changes not only in the Merger 
Regulation but also in the likewise redrafted Implementing Regulation
7 (Dittert 2004; Lingos et 
al. 2004). This includes in particular the possibility to extend the time limits in complex cases 
(Article 10 ECMR),  the  precise  definition  of  the  Commission's  investigative  powers  and 
sanctions  (Articles 11-15 ECMR)  and  firms'  extended  duties  to  furnish  information 
(Articles 3, 4 DVO).  Finally,  the  "more  economic  approach"  has  led  to  a  number  of 
organisational  changes  within  the  Competition  Directorate  General  (Drauz 2002,  p. 397; 
Pons/Sautter 2004, p. 57; Röller 2005, p. 15). One is the appointment of Prof. L.-H. Röller as 
5 The old Article 2 (3) ECMR was formulated as follows: "A concentration which creates or strengthens a dominant 
position which would significantly impede effective competition in the common market or in a substantial part of it 
shall be declared incompatible with the common market."
6 The HHI is the sum of the squares of the individual market shares of all the firms in the market.
7 Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 of 7 April 2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 
on the control of concentrations between undertakings, in: Official Journal L 133, 30/04/2004, pp. 1-39.A. Christiansen The more economic approach in EU merger control 4
the first Chief Economist who heads up a team of - at present ten – PhD industrial economists 
(Chief  Economist  Team,  CET).  In  addition,  the  European  Advisory  Group  on  Competition 
Policy (EAGCP) has been set up as an academic advisory body which consists of around 20 
leading  European  industrial  economists  recommended  by  the  Chief  Economist.
8  Regular 
seminars and conferences serve to further intensify the exchange of know-how. On the other 
hand, the Merger Task Force has been disbanded and its members have been integrated into the 
existing sector-specific directorates.
First effects of the "more economic approach" are also visible in the Commission's case practice, 
although  its  implementation  is  still  by  no  means  completed.
9  So  far  there  has  been  no 
prohibition on the basis of the new SIEC test, nor has a merger been approved on the grounds of 
efficiency gains. Nonetheless, there is evidence of greater recourse to statistical and econometric 
methods of analysis (German Federal Cartel Office 2004, pp. 4ff.; Hofer et al. 2005; German 
Monopolies Commission 2005, Nos. 798ff.; Van Bergeijk/Klosterhuis 2005). At the same time, 
economic experts being involved more strongly, both in the Commission and on behalf of the 
companies (see 3.1 below). This begins with the delineation of the relevant market in product 
and geographic terms with the aid of price correlation analyses, co-integration analyses and 
especially the hypothetical monopolist or SSNIP ("small but significant non-transitory increase 
in  price")  test.  A  current  example  is  the  Blackstone/Acetex  case
10,  for  which  econometric 
studies  were  undertaken  both  by  the  economists  engaged  by  the  firms  and  by  the  CET 
(Durand/Rabassa 2005). The field extends even further to include the differentiated analysis of 
the effects of the merger on the basis of simulation models (see 1.2 below). The Volvo/Scania 
case
11 is the earliest example with the study by Ivaldi/Verboven (2001), although at that time the 
Commission still avoided explicitly citing it in the reasoning for its decision. This was different 
in  later  cases  such  as  General  Electric/Instrumentarium
12  or  Oracle/PeopleSoft
13.  These 
instruments are likely to acquire still greater importance. 
8 The present members include Marc Ivaldi, Bruce Lyons, Massimo Motta, Damien Neven, Paul Seabright, Frank 
Verboven and Martin Hellwig, who have all published articles on various aspects of the more economic approach 
(see references). In July 2005, a working group also submitted a widely-heeded reform proposal for the application 
of the control of abusive practices pursuant to Article 82 of the EC Treaty (EAGCP 2005).
9 It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the Commission's entire case practice. Cases of special relevance are 
cited by way of example.
10 Case No COMP/M.3625 - Blackstone/Acetex, in: Official Journal L 312, 29/11/2005, pp. 60-62.
11 Case No COMP/M.1672 - Volvo/Scania, in: Official Journal L 143, 29/05/2001, pp. 74-132. 
12 Case No COMP/M.3083 - GE/Instrumentarium, in: Official Journal L 109, 16/04/2004, pp. 1-63. 
13 Case No COMP/M.3216 - Oracle/PeopleSoft, in: Official Journal L 218, 23/08/2005, pp. 6-12.A. Christiansen The more economic approach in EU merger control 5
1.2 Anti-competitive effects and efficiencies as a "countervailing factor"
The  Guidelines  introduced  the  differentiation  –  originating  from  US  practice  -  between 
coordinated  and  non-coordinated  effects  for  the  first  time.  This  differs  from  the  earlier 
distinction between "single firm" and collective market dominance (see Kerber 2000, pp. 72ff.). 
While coordinated effects represent a further refinement of the concept of collective dominance, 
the intention, with the inclusion of unilateral effects, is explicitly to close a gap existing under 
the  old  Merger  Regulation  with  regard  to  anti-competitive  mergers  in  oligopolistic  markets 
"below"  the  market  dominance  threshold  (Röller/Strohm 2005,  No. 18;  Zimmer 2004). 
Conversely, for the first time, efficiencies as a "countervailing factor" can result in approval 
despite  market  dominance.  These  concepts  constitute  the  substantive  core  of  the  "more 
economic approach".
Unilateral effects can emerge if competitive pressure from one (or more) sellers is removed. 
This can lead to increased market power especially for the merging firms, thus widening the 
scope  for  profitably  increasing  prices  or  reducing  output.  This  does  not  require  an  aligned 
reaction on the part of the remaining competitors nor a dominant position in the sense of the old 
Merger  Directive.  Rather,  the  decisive  factor  is  the  degree  of  substitutability  between  the 
products of the merging parties and those supplied by other producers. Unilateral effects are 
therefore likely to occur primarily in differentiated product markets. The Guidelines cite, as 
conducive factors, high market shares and a high level of competition between the merging 
parties, the lack of alternatives for customers and the unlikelihood of supply being increased by 
competitors (Guidelines, paras 27ff.). 
The assessment of unilateral effects in the concrete case requires a quantitative projection of the 
(short-term) price and volume changes as a result of the merger. So-called "merger simulation 
models"  are  normally  used  for  this  purpose  (e. g. Capps et al. 2003;  Dubow et al. 2004;  Van 
Bergeijk/Klosterhuis 2005). For simulation models of this kind, information is needed on the 
form or structure of the given market and the primary competitive parameters (price, quantity, 
capacity).
14  The  degree  of  substitutability  can  be  measured  primarily  on  the  basis  of  the 
"diversion ratio"
15. In addition, the own-price elasticities and cross-price  elasticities
16 of the 
14 Price competition is also known as Bertrand behaviour. Only if the firms first select capacities independently of 
each other and then fix the price are the market results according to Kreps/Scheinkman (1983) identical to the 
quantity competition à la Cournot.
15 The diversion ratio indicates what portion of the reduction in sales of a given product resulting from a price 
increase – other conditions being equal - is absorbed by another product.
16  Own-price  elasticity  indicates  the  extent  to  which  demand  changes  if  the  own  product  price  is  changed. 
Conversely, the cross-price elasticity of demand indicates how strongly demand for a product changes in response 
to changes in the price of another product, assuming that all other conditions remain constant. A. Christiansen The more economic approach in EU merger control 6
relevant products must be known and any cost changes and competitors' reaction to the merger 
need to be estimated. The concept and the simulation models have already been in use in US 
merger  control  for  some  time  (Starek/Stockum 1995).  The  theoretical  background  is  the 
industrial economics models on incentives for mergers in oligopolies that have been developed 
primarily since the 1980s.
17
Coordinated effects, on the other hand, result if the merger for the first time enables or makes it 
easier for the remaining market players to implicitly coordinate their behaviour. The term tacit 
collusion is also used, since there are no explicit agreements, which would also be in violation 
of  Article  81  of  the  EC  Treaty.  Competition  between  the  firms  which  are  coordinating  is 
(largely)  eliminated.  Therefore,  collectively,  they  have  market  power  which  may  involve 
increasing prices, limiting output or dividing up the market. In contrast to unilateral effects, this 
is  more  likely  to  emerge  in  homogeneous  markets.  The  Guidelines  define  four  cumulative 
criteria  (Guidelines,  paras 39ff.).  First,  it  must  be  relatively  simple  to  reach  a  common 
understanding on the terms of coordination. The coordinating firms must also be able to monitor 
each other's behaviour and they must be able to discipline any deviation. Finally, the reactions 
of  customers  and  current  and  future  competitors  should  not  be  able  to  jeopardise  the 
coordination. In the concrete case, a number of structural features of the firms and markets 
concerned are assessed such as market shares and the number of firms, market transparency, 
degree of product homogeneity and demand patterns. 
All in all, these criteria dovetail more or less exactly with the rulings in the Court of First 
Instance's Airtours decision (Bishop/Ridyard 2003, p. 360f.). At the same time, they are closely 
aligned to the industrial economics analysis of  collusion in oligopolistic markets.
18 Another 
aspect to be assessed is the existence of so-called "maverick" firms with characteristics not 
typical  of  the  industry  which  therefore  have  a  strong  incentive  to  deviate  from  or  disrupt 
coordination. A problem emerges especially if such a firm is likely to be removed as the result 
of a merger. The commentaries in the Guidelines are therefore largely in line with US practice 
(Baker 2002).
The  second  important  change  is  the  consideration  given  to  efficiencies  as  a  "countervailing 
factor" to counteract increased market power, although the conditions for their consideration are 
very restrictive (Guidelines, paras 76ff.). For instance, the efficiencies must be merger-specific 
and must be verifiable, and they must – at least in part – benefit consumers. Here, the burden of 
17 Key studies are Deneckere/Davidson (1985), Farrell/Shapiro (1990) and Werden/Froeb (1994).A. Christiansen The more economic approach in EU merger control 7
proof lies with the firms, in contrast to the normal merger control procedure. In this connection, 
the expected efficiency gains have to be weighed quantitatively against merger–related losses in 
economic welfare (Colley 2004). This can only be done on the basis of an individual in-depth 
analysis, which also requires the use of a simulation model (German Federal Cartel Office 2004, 
pp. 7ff.). So, here, there are certain parallels with the assessment of unilateral effects. All in all, 
another economic concept has been incorporated which, based on the theory of Williamson 
(1968) and known as "efficiency defense", is already established practice in US merger control. 
To sum up, the Commission has adopted a number of new microeconomic concepts in EU 
merger control and has formulated detailed criteria for their application in the Guidelines. At the 
same time this represents a (further) alignment to US practice (Coppi/Walker 2004). That the 
Commission's motives have been in this direction was clearly evident. Firstly, "transatlantic 
convergence"  has  been  presented  in  a  very  positive  light  (e. g.  Röller 2005,  p. 13;  other 
references  in  Christiansen 2005,  p. 293).  Secondly,  the  Commission  is  no  doubt  anxious  to 
avoid harsh criticism of the kind encountered in the aftermath of the General Electric/Honeywell 
case
19 and the resulting loss of face. From an economic point of view, such a convergence is to 
be  welcomed  if  this  reduces  the  transaction  costs  for  cross-border  mergers.  One  criticism, 
however, is that the convergence with US practice was not explicitly formulated as a goal of the 
reform and could therefore not be discussed. Furthermore, there are still important differences in 
the  underlying  assumptions  and  convictions  (e. g.  Denzel 2004;  Mueller 1997)  and  in  the 
institutional framework. 
2. Substantive effects of the "more economic approach"
In the following, the effects of the reform on the decision-making process in EU merger control 
are  examined  in  order  to  be  able  to  make  a  rough  estimation  of  the  associated  costs  and 
benefits.
20  Here,  it  is  helpful  to  resort  to  the  so-called  "error  cost  approach"  which  was 
developed in the economic analysis of law to analyse the welfare effects of legal rulemaking 
(Christiansen/Kerber 2005, pp. 7ff.; Ehrlich/Posner 1974). The key factors are, on the one hand, 
the administrative cost of the proceedings and, secondly, the frequency of errors. These two 
points are discussed separately below. Legal certainty is another economically relevant aspect. 
18 A fundamental earlier work was the study by Stigler (1964). More recent studies model the problem on game 
theory (for an overview see Bagwell/Wolinsky 2002; Jacquemin/Slade 1989).
19 Case No COMP/M.2220 - General Electric/Honeywell, in: Official Journal L 48, 18/02/2004, pp. 1-85.
20 Sections 2.1 and 2.2 especially are an important further development of  my analysis in Christiansen (2005, 
p. 287ff.).A. Christiansen The more economic approach in EU merger control 8
2.1 Increased administrative burden
The cost of the EU merger control process depends primarily on the  extensive rules in the 
Merger Regulation and the Implementing Regulation (Dittert 2004; Lingos et al. 2004). The old 
Merger Regulation
21 had  already  contained strict  time limits for the proceedings, disclosure 
requirements and rules on professional secrets, rights of hearing and liaison with the competition 
authorities of the member states. The structure of the official notification form (Form CO), the 
rights of hearing and inspection, and the handling of confidential information had also been 
regulated in the old Implementing Regulation
22. Regarding the scope of the proceedings, the 
Commission still aims in particular to involve competitors and customers of the merging parties 
(e. g. Drauz 2002, p. 397). The upshot is that this framework of formal and informal rules results 
in  a  complex  "bargaining  game"  between  the  authority/authorities  and  firms,  involving  a 
considerable burden in terms of time and cost (Neven et al. 1993, pp. 150ff.).
23
In  the  course  of  the  reform  process  these  rules  have  been  changed  in  such  a  way  that  the 
administrative  burden  rises.  To  begin  with,  the  (new)  Article 3 (2) of  the  Implementing 
Regulation  requires  that  the  notification  form  and  all  documents  must  be  submitted  in  the 
originals  and  in  35  copies  (!)  as  compared  with  the  24  and  19  copies  previously  required. 
Furthermore,  the  notifying  parties  have  to  furnish  more  extensive  information 
(Lingos et al. 2004, pp. 80ff.). The market share threshold for details about competitors has been 
lowered from 10% to 5%. In addition, for the first time pre-merger and post-merger HHI values 
have  to  be  calculated  for  all  the  affected  markets  (Section  7.3  of  Form  CO).  Particularly 
exacting requirements are associated with the newly incorporated “efficiencies defense”, which 
is conceived as a case-by-case review with the burden of proof lying with the firms (Section 9.3 
of  Form  CO).  The  efficiency  gains  not  only  have  to  be  quantified,  but  evidence  has  to  be 
produced that they can only be realised by the merger and that they – at least in part – benefit 
consumers. Furthermore, the Guidelines (para 88) contain a list of acceptable documents which 
has to be observed and includes documents such as internal management documents or pre-
merger studies conducted by external experts. All in all, the new rules lead to a considerably 
increased burden for firms in the notification procedure, not only in respect of the “efficiencies 
21  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  4064/89  of  21  December  1989  on  the  control  of  concentrations  between 
undertakings, in: Official Journal L 395, 30/12/1989, pp. 1-12.
22 Commission regulation (EC) No 3384/94 of 21 December 1994 on the notifications, time limits and hearings 
provided for in Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, in: 
Official Journal L 377, 31/12/1994, pp. 1-27.
23 According to the results of a survey published in Voigt/Schmidt (2005, p. 8f.) before the reform it already took 
firms more than 64 man/days on average to prepare the notification documents, and roughly 8 meetings on average 
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defense”.  This  affects  the  Commission,  too,  since  it  has  to  examine  and  consider  all  the 
documents. 
Beyond the formal procedural rules, increasing quantitative analysis also means a considerably 
greater administrative burden. Just the market delineation using the SSNIP test increases the 
data required versus the traditional relevant market concept (Hildebrand 2005, pp. 514f.). This 
applies still more to the new simulation models, whose informative value depends to a crucial 
extent on the quality and completeness of the empirical data, which again results in considerable 
costs (German Federal Cartel Office 2004, p. 6; Capps et al. 2003; Dubow 2004, p. 117; Van 
Bergeijk/Klosterhuis 2005). Ideally, information needs to be submitted by all firms operating in 
the relevant market and, at the same time, needs be comparable and be available over a given 
period of time. Further costs result from the specification and testing of the econometric models. 
Again, this affects not only the firms involved but also the authority since it has to conduct its 
own studies and examine those submitted by the firms. It also has to make the data files and 
calculations accessible for inspection by the firms in a specially shielded "data room".
24 This 
was particularly evident in the critical General Electric/Instrumentarium and Oracle/PeopleSoft 
cases,  both  of  which  involved  unilateral  effects  on  bidding  markets  (Hofer et 
al. 2005, pp. 160ff.;  Käseberg 2005;  Loriot et al. 2004;  Pflanz 2005).  In  each  case  the 
Commission conducted its own quantitative analyses of the bidding data in order to assess the 
relevant  degree  of  substitutability.  The  companies,  or  the  consultants  engaged  by  them, 
submitted extensive studies, too: in the  first case RBB Economics for  General Electric  and 
NERA Economic Consultants for the competitor Philips, and in the second case PeopleSoft 
itself and Lexecon for the bidder Oracle. 
The proceedings could become even more cumbersome in the case of the “efficiencies defense” 
where  the  (unilateral)  price  effects  and  the  efficiency  gains  have  to  be  estimated  and  then 
weighed against each other. The quantitative analysis also tends to stretch out the proceedings. 
In the Oracle/PeopleSoft case, for instance, the Commission had to suspend the time limits for 
six months until Oracle submitted further data (Pflanz 2005, p. 123). The new possibility to 
extend  the  time  limits  in  complex  cases  now  provided  for  in  Article 10   of  the  Merger 
Regulation, which is explained particularly by reference to the quantitative studies that need to 
be undertaken (Dittert 2004, pp. 149ff.; Drauz 2002, pp. 392f.), would appear to support this 
view. All in all, the evidence points to a permanently increased administrative burden which, in 
24 It is also conceivable at least in principle that the national competition authorities would want to inspect the data 
files  and  calculations,  too,  in  connection  with  their  involvement  in  the  Advisory  Committee  according  to 
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the sense of the error cost approach, results in higher administrative costs and thus detracts from 
the economic welfare benefit to society. 
2.2 De facto diminished legal certainty
At the start of the reform discussion the Commission cited the increase in legal certainty as a 
central benefit of the new approach. It was repeatedly argued that (only) through the greater 
application of economic concepts could the decision-making be made more transparent and thus 
more predictable. According to Drauz (2002, p. 392), for instance, the goal is "to make the 
theoretical framework underlying our economic assessment of mergers clear and transparent and 
thus as predictable as possible" (further references in Christiansen 2005, p. 287). This raises the 
subject of legal certainty which, in German (competition) law literature, has been defined as 
follows:  "Legal  certainty  protects  the  citizen  against  unexpected  intervention  by  the  state 
(negative interest, especially predictability)" (Rittner 1969, p. 76).
That  legal  certainty  is  fundamentally  beneficial  can  be  corroborated  in  economic  terms. 
Eucken (1952),  for  instance,  demonstrated  clearly,  with  his  postulate  of  the  constancy  of 
economic policy, the fundamental importance of a reliable regulatory framework, with which 
the predictability of state actions, and thus legal certainty, are inseparably linked. Hayek (1960) 
can be cited, too, with  his insights into the  central importance of the  "rule of law" for the 
functioning of a decentralised market economy. These theories argue accordingly in favour of 
general rules which effectively limit the sphere of state activity and create a sphere of individual 
freedom, and thus legal certainty. These traditional arguments from regulatory economics are 
supported by a raft of more recent empirical studies which provide evidence that discretionary 
state  action  has  negative  effects  on  economic  growth  (Henisz 2000,  Klump/Reichel 1994; 
Mahoney 2001;  Scully 1997).  By  inverse  inference,  this  underlines  the  importance  of  legal 
certainty.  Another  comparative  international  study  even  establishes  a  direct  positive  link 
between  (subjectively  perceived)  legal  certainty  and  the  level  of  investment  and  economic 
growth  (Brunetti et al. 1998).  The  positive  impact  of  decision-making  certainty  on  corporate 
investment  behaviour  has  also  been  demonstrated  by  more  recent  studies,  in  which  the 
importance of irreversibility is a central argument (e. g. Pyndick 1991; Carruth et al. 2000).
The studies by Voigt/Schmidt (2003; 2005) are approaches which can be applied well to the 
concrete case of the current reform of EU merger control. In the context of merger control, legal 
certainty means, firstly, that the parties wishing to merge should be able to predict the reaction 
of the competition authority with sufficient reliability. This is desirable so as to enable firms to 
realise welfare-enhancing transactions while discouraging them from filing an excessive number 
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ending  in  prohibitions,  with  attendant  high  sunk  costs  and  damage  to  reputation  (see  also 
Neven et al. 1993, p. 152). Secondly, legal certainty has a time dimension in the sense of the 
time it takes to reach an administrative decision or for its judicial review.
We therefore need to examine what impact the new rules associated with the "more economic 
approach"  have  on  this  goal.  The  better  transparency  and  greater  legal  certainty  which  the 
European Commission expects from the more economics-based approach implies that the (new) 
concepts provide a clear (or at least clearer) benchmark for the assessment of concrete merger 
cases. In the extreme, this would turn case decisions into simple derivations from the underlying 
theoretical  models.  However,  for  good  reason,  economics  cannot  be  fitted  into  this  mould. 
Firstly, it cannot derive clear statements about the effects of a given concentration and their 
appraisal and, secondly, economic concepts cannot be applied directly to practical cases. Rather, 
in economic competition theory there are constant divergences and a plurality of approaches 
(Burton 1994). One prominent example is the dispute, prevailing until (at least) into the late 
1980s, between the "Harvard school" and the "Chicago school", which differed considerably not 
only  in  their  theoretical  and  empirical  foundations  but  also  in  their  normative  objectives 
(Audretsch 1988;  Schmidtchen 1994).  In  addition,  there  were  other,  albeit  less  developed, 
approaches  such  as  the  free  competition  concept  (Hoppmann 1988)  or  the  Austrian  market 
process  theory  (e. g. Kirzner 1997),  each  of  which  adopted  a  fundamentally  different 
perspective. Even though competition economics has moved on since then, this plurality points 
to a universal insight which is still relevant for the present status quo. It clearly testifies to the 
(inevitably)  "competitive  character  of  theoretical  knowledge"  (Watrin 1967,  p. 11)  which 
invariably leads in practice to divergences in the recommendations given or in case appraisals.
This circumstance is also true – albeit in slightly modified form – of the now dominant new 
industrial economics based on oligopoly models rooted in game theory (for an overview, see 
Bagwell/Wolinsky 2002;  Jacquemin 1999;  Shapiro 1989).  Besides  the  analysis  of  merger 
incentives, other major areas of research include predatory pricing strategies, strategic entry 
deterrence  and  the  conditions  for  stable  collusion.  In  contrast  to  the  earlier  "schools",  new 
industrial  economics  does  not  proceed  from  a  basic  competition  policy  assumption  like  the 
market power thesis of the "Harvard school" or the efficiency thesis of the "Chicago school". 
Rather, its common ground is the use of the same methodology and (total) economic welfare as 
the objective. The upshot is a wide range of theoretical studies whose conclusions are in part 
contradictory  or  are  only  valid  for  very  specific  assumptions.  Hence,  particular  patterns  of 
behaviour can in principle have both positive and negative welfare effects. On the other hand, a 
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allow the scope of validity of the individual models to be delineated, and thus the respectively 
relevant model to be selected, are lacking (Fisher 1989). The underlying reason for this resides 
in the nature of (industrial) economics knowledge, for "industrial organisation is hardly an exact 
science" (Schmalensee 1987, p. 42). So there is no exact economic theory of competition and 
there is unlikely to be one in the future either. Rather, there are good reasons for sustaining the 
plurality. After all, it is the resulting controversy that is the driving force behind the advances in 
knowledge (Burton 1994, p. 21, Watrin 1967).
However, its application in the field of competition policy raises serious problems which have 
implications not only for current "post-Chicago antitrust" practice in the US (Hovenkamp 2001; 
Kobayashi 1997) but also for the "more economic approach" in the EU. Case analysis becomes 
much more complex because the cases have to be analysed more strongly on an individual basis 
rather than drawing on general relationships in the sense of assumption criteria for instance. 
While new industrial economics allows more differentiated theoretical analyses, the assessment 
of concrete cases is often controversial (similarly Bagwell/Wolinsky 2002, p. 1886). Moreover, 
the econometric models are also sensitive to the underlying assumptions (Dubow et al. 2004, 
p. 117). An added factor in the concrete case of EU merger control is that, with the analysis of 
unilateral effects and the “efficiencies defense”, it is possible not only for mergers "below" the 
previously relevant market dominance threshold to be prohibited but also for mergers "above" it 
to  be  approved.  This  widens  the  room  for  discretionary  decisions  in  the  appraisal  process 
(e. g. Bishop/Ridyard 2003;  German  Monopolies  Commission,  Nos. 222ff.,  Voigt/Schmidt 
2003; Zimmer 2004), thus making the Commission's decisions permanently more difficult to 
predict.
25 Legal certainty is therefore not improved but diminished. On top of that there is the 
temporary effect that a change in the assessment criteria always causes uncertainty and, as a 
result,  adjustment  and  learning  costs  for  those  concerned  (Voigt/Schmidt 2004).  Hence,  the 
"more economic approach" is found to have negative repercussions also as far as legal certainty 
is concerned which also detract from the welfare benefit to society. It now needs to be examined 
what potentially welfare-enhancing effects it has on decision quality.
2.3 Effects on decision quality
The improvement in decision quality moved more and more to the fore in the course of the 
reform discussion. Supporters see enhanced "discrimination" as the decisive benefit of the "more 
economic approach" (e. g. Hildebrand 2005; Hofer et al. 2005; Röller 2005). This means that it 
25 This can be offset at most only partially by the continued incorporation of market dominance as an example and 
the publication of guidelines for the first time (e. g. Lyons 2004, p. 258f.; Monti 2004b, p. 7), even though these 
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will be possible to identify anti-competitive mergers, on the one hand, and welfare-enhancing 
transactions, on the other, more reliably. Reproduced below is an overview illustrating the cases 
which can arise.
Overview of types of error and welfare effects
Welfare effect of the merger
Negative Positive
Approval Error Type I
(direct welfare loss)
Correct decision








Improved decision-making quality would mean a reduction in the frequency of the two types of 
error which can arise – in addition to correct decisions – in the form of unjustified approvals 
(Error Type I, "false positive") and unjustified prohibitions (Error Type II, "false negative"). In 
both cases the potentially achievable level of economic welfare is not attained. In the first case 
this results in direct welfare losses while, in the second, potential efficiencies are not realised. 
The overview shows the scenarios that are possible. According to the "error cost approach" there 
would be an improvement in decision-making quality if the new criteria lead to a reduction of 
errors compared with practice before the reform. 
This was claimed explicitly to be an argument for incorporating unilateral effects in EU merger 
control. The intention was to eliminate a systematic source of error in the old market dominance 
test (e. g. Röller/Strom 2005, No. 8; Vickers 2004). There had been a gap in respect of certain 
welfare-reducing mergers in heterogeneous oligopolistic markets "below" the market dominance 
threshold. This resulted in Type I errors in the sense of the "error cost approach". The existence 
of such a gap is indicated in the first place by the fact that the appraisal of unilateral effects is 
one of the most important developments in "post-Chicago antitrust" practice in the US (e. g. 
Hovenkamp 2001,  p. 332).  Moreover,  studies  for  the  EU  would  appear  to  bear  out  their 
relevance to some extent (Baxter/Dethmers 2005, Neven/Röller 2002). 
Evidence in the form of a significant number  of concrete cases where the Commission has 
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Airtours and FirstChoice merger
26, which the Commission prohibited in 1999 and where the 
decision  was  reversed  in  2002  by  the  Court  of  First  Instance  (German  Monopolies 
Commission 2005, Nos. 219-221; Motta 2000). The fact that the Commission already examined 
unilateral price effects before the reform, and thereby also resorted to econometric methods, 
primarily in bidding markets (Hofer et al. 2005; Käseberg 2005; Völcker 2004, pp. 397-401) at 
least  qualifies  the  dimension  of  the  alleged  gap.  Here,  Philips/Agilent
27  and  the 
GE/Instrumentarium and Oracle/PeopleSoft cases mentioned earlier relate explicitly to (narrow) 
oligopolistic markets. Even though this list does not claim to be exhaustive, it does put the 
argument  of  the  systematic  occurrence  of  "false  positives"  before  the  reform  into  better 
perspective. The cases cited demonstrate, at least by way of example, that the Commission took 
account of the special competitive effects of mergers on differentiated oligopolistic markets and 
was familiar with the econometric instruments for analysing them.
As to the coordinated effects, no reduction of errors is likely simply for the reason that the 
relative  criteria are closely  aligned to the concept of collective market dominance  from the 
Airtours decision under the old Merger Regulation. Here, there is more a risk of not being able 
to prohibit anti-competitive mergers in view of the exacting requirements regarding evidence 
(German Federal Cartel Office 2004, p. 4; Vickers 2004, pp. 458f.). In the sense of the "error 
cost  approach"  this  would  lead  to  errors  of  the  first  type.
28  Experience  from  the 
Sony/Bertelsmann Music Group case
29 is an example that confirms this (Eberl 2004). In this
case, the Commission found a whole number of factors favourable to collusion in the relevant 
market for recorded sound media such as stability of the customer base, contracting demand, 
multi-market contacts and structural links between the leading market players. However, the 
analysis of various time series did not produce supportable evidence of concerted behaviour. 
The  merger  therefore  had  to  be  approved  unconditionally  even  though  there  were  major 
reservations in view of the experience from the music industry (e. g. Thompson 2004).
Like  the  inclusion  of  unilateral  effects,  the  introduction  of  the  “efficiencies  defense”  is  a 
reaction to the criticism of the old Merger Regulation. It was claimed that efficiencies had been 
falsely used as an argument against the merging parties and that welfare-enhancing mergers had 
therefore been prevented (so-called "efficiency offense”, e. g. Padilla 2004). In the sense of the 
26 Case IV/M.1524 - Airtours/First Choice, in: Official Journal L 93, 13/04/2000, pp. 1 -33.
27 Case No COMP/M.2256 - Philips/Agilent Health Care Solutions, in: Official Journal C 292, 18/10/2001, pp. 1-10.
28 However, it should be added that – in contrast to unilateral price increases – action can be taken against post-
merger collusive behaviour in certain circumstances by recourse to Art. 81 or 82 of the EC Treaty, so the negative 
effects can at least be corrected ex post facto. 
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"error cost approach" these would be Type II errors. However, the empirical evidence for this 
claim is fairly weak. In their econometric study Neven/Röller (2002) detect only a few Type II 
errors. There is no reference either to concrete cases apart from the General Electric/Honeywell 
merger and this case is questionable. The prohibition was recently upheld by the Court of First 
Instance, which would appear to argue against a false decision by the Commission.
30 Experience 
with the “efficiencies defense” in the US also suggests that this new rule has little relevance in 
practice. So far there has been no publicly available evidence of an approval decision based on 
efficiencies (Colley 2004, pp. 342f.). All in all, no significant reduction of errors is therefore to 
be expected either from the introduction of the “efficiencies defense” in EU merger control. 
Moreover, the concrete conditions are so strictly formulated in the Guidelines that they cannot 
be fulfilled in practice (Schwalbe 2005).
The massive problems associated with the application of the “efficiencies defense” also need to 
be considered. In particular, there are information asymmetries in the authority's disfavour and 
fundamental  knowledge  problems  (Jacquemin 1999,  pp. 214ff.;  Yao/Dahdouh 1993). 
Efficiencies can only emerge in the future and are therefore only potentials at the time of the 
review. It might also be that, after the merger, the firms have no incentive to realise the benefits 
or  to  pass  them  on  to  the  consumer  owing  to  reduced  competitive  pressure  (Böge 2004, 
pp. 146f.). Indeed, the related empirical experience, especially with major mergers which this 
would normally involve, is far from convincing (e.g. Mueller 2004). From this perspective there 
is even a risk that application of the “efficiencies defense” would lead to Type I errors because 
welfare-reducing mergers might be allowed. Consequently, the economic benefit of this new 
pro-and-contra weighing analysis is questionable. Preferable would be a simpler rule such as an 
across-the-board  consideration  of  efficiencies  up  to  a  given  economics-based  threshold 
(Schwalbe 2005).  At  the  same  time  this  would  make  for  greater  legal  certainty  and  avoid 
considerable additional administrative cost.
All in all, the effects of the "more economic approach" on decision quality are ambivalent. The 
largely unchanged analysis of coordinated effects and the newly adopted “efficiencies defense”, 
for  instance,  are  not  only  unlikely  to  lead  to  a  reduction  of  errors  versus  the  old  Merger 
Regulation  but,  in  both  cases,  even  harbour  the  risk  of  Type  I  errors.  For  the  appraisal  of 
unilateral effects, which will probably have the most practical relevance, the outcome is more 
positive. All the same, the gap in the old Merger Regulation which this is intended to close, and 
the associated reduction of Type I errors, needs to be put into much smaller perspective. At the 
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present time it is still unclear what quantitative importance the individual effects discussed will 
have, however. The impact of the reform on decision quality in the EU merger control process 
as a whole is at any rate still an open question. Moreover, any statement about the welfare 
effects must also take account of the previously analysed rise in administrative costs and the 
reduction  in  legal  certainty.  Even  without  quantifying  these  effects  of  the  "more  economic 
approach"  there  is  every  indication  that  the  costs  associated  with  the  reform  outweigh  the 
benefits.
3. Institutional implications of the new approach
The  critical  assessment  of  the  "more  economic  approach"  would  be  incomplete  without  a 
discussion of the important implications for the institutional framework in EU merger control. 
However, this has been lacking (largely) in the discussion in the literature and practice to date. 
A number of significant insights from institutional economics can be applied to EU merger 
control.
31 These will be discussed below.
3.1 Consequences of the increasing involvement of economic experts
The "more economic approach" leads to increasing recourse to economic experts. For instance, 
in the course of the reform the European Commission created the new post of Chief Economist 
and his team so as to provide an institutional basis, too, for the economic expertise. In addition, 
it  regularly  engages  academic  (industrial)  economists.  An  early  example  is  the  study  by 
Ivaldi/Verboven (2001) in the Volvo/Scania case. A more recent case is the report by the newly 
created Economic Advisory Group on Article 82 of the EC Treaty (EAGCP 2005). Companies, 
on the other hand, resort especially to specialised consulting firms.
32 The GE/Instrumentarium 
and  Oracle/PeopleSoft  cases  are  prime  examples.  Members  of  the  consulting  firms  also 
participate in the public debate through regular publications in the relevant journals. Typically, 
they  criticise  the  old  competition  policy  and  elaborate  on,  or  support,  the  "more  economic 
approach".
33 This is also true of the representatives of the European Commission, especially the 
Chief Economist and his team.
34 This growing economic input in the merger control process is 
to be welcomed in principle. However, the relevant literature, especially in the US, shows that 
31 Another important aspect, which is not discussed here, is the so-called delineation of powers, in other words the 
demarcation of authority and responsibilities in relation to the national merger control regimes (for details see 
Budzinski/Christiansen 2005b).
32 This includes, inter alia, National Economic Research Associates (NERA), Lexecon, LECG, RBB Economics, 
Charles River Associates (CRA), European Economic & Marketing Consultants (EE & MC).
33 Examples are Bishop/Ridyard (2003), Coppi/Walker (2004), Hildebrand (2005) and Hofer et al. (2005).
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this can also create problems. This needs to be taken into account if a positive contribution from 
the economic experts is to be guaranteed.
Firstly, it needs to be borne in mind that the growing involvement of experts upgrades the role 
of the firms in collecting and evaluating empirical data and thus strengthens the influence they 
can have on this information. This is even explicitly provided for in the case of the “efficiencies 
defense”, with the reversal of the burden of proof. In the analysis of unilateral and coordinated 
effects, too, the tendency points clearly in the same direction. The merger control process in the 
EU is thus converging with the US system, where the authorities always have to go through the 
court to prohibit a merger. The authority is then no longer (only) the impartial investigator, 
which is a characteristic of the so-called "inquisitorial system" customary in the EU. Rather, its 
role is comparable to that of a party in the so-called "adversarial system" in the US, where the 
sides are both equally responsible for gathering and submitting evidence and for reviewing the 
material submitted by the other party. The discussion in the general economic analysis of law 
concerning  (optimal)  trial  procedure  and  proof-taking  (e. g.  Dewatripont/Tirole 1999; 
Palumbo 2001) provides a point of departure for analysing the implications that this gives rise 
to. It raises a number of interesting insights which can only be touched on briefly here. An 
argument in favour the  "inquisitorial system", for instance, is that it avoids possibilities for 
manipulation by the parties and the duplication of resources. The advantage of the "adversarial 
system", on the other hand, is that there is a stronger incentive for the parties to conduct their 
own fact-finding. 
Secondly, economic expertise faces the fundamental problem that economics is an "inexact" 
science. The analysis of a concrete merger can lead to different results depending on the model 
and the data used. This has an important consequence:  "Economists cannot testify  with the 
confidence  of  experts  on  ballistics  or  fingerprints  -  or  at  least  they  should  not" 
(Schmalensee 1987, p. 42). Some of the resulting implications have already been debated at 
length in the discussion in the US because the involvement of expert witnesses in the antitrust 
process has been customary practice for some time. The statutory basis is the Federal Rules of 
Evidence,  on  which  there  are  a  number  of  court  decisions  and  extensive  literature  (e. g. 
Hovenkamp 2002; Weller 1997). Moreover, there are economic analyses which have pointed 
not  only  to  the  associated  problems  but  also  to  possible  solutions  (e. g.  Mandel 1999; 
Posner 1999; Stigler 1982). One issue discussed is especially the possibility for firms to seek out 
experts  who  will  give  evidence  in  their  favour  (so-called  "forum  shopping"; 
Shuman et al. 1991). In the extreme case, there is the risk of experts acting as so-called "hired 
guns"  or  "jukebox  experts"  who  say  exactly  what  their  clients  want  to  hear  ("lip  service" A. Christiansen The more economic approach in EU merger control 18
testimony). It can also lead to a "battle of experts" which, in the end result, only neutralises each 
side's  testimonies  and  consumes  resources  without  helping  the  decision-making  process. 
However, it was also found that these risks can be counteracted – at least in part – by other 
factors.  Reputational  effects  are  one  example.  Especially  for  more  prominent  (industrial) 
economists the work as expert witness is a repeated game in analytical respects, so they have an 
interest in building a reputation as a competent expert.
35 They are also bound by their history of 
academic publications and cannot therefore make completely arbitrary statements. Moreover, 
there is partial consensus, at least in methodological respects, on generally accepted standards 
with which the quality of rival expert testimonies can be appraised. Another important criterion 
is the quality of the data used, especially their verifiability. 
These insights have received little consideration to date in the discussion about EU merger 
control. In the literature this is touched on only briefly, if at all. The Chief Economist Röller, for 
instance, has merely commented that problems can arise if the resources for conducting expert 
quantitative studies are asymmetrically distributed (2005, p. 20). Gerber (2004) raises a deeper 
issue  by  referring  to  the  problem  that,  in  the  three  cases  in  2002  in  which  it  reversed  the 
Commission's decisions, the Court of First  Instance de  facto  assumed  the role of economic 
expert itself, replacing the Commission's appraisal with its own economic interpretation of the 
cases. This raises the question especially of the division of powers between the two institutions. 
The  diverse  other  implications  which  the  growing  involvement  of  economic  experts  in  the 
merger control process raises have not been considered in the discussion to date, which suggests 
too narrow a perception of the ramifications of a more economics-based approach.
3.2 Political interventions and rent-seeking
EU merger control has harboured a fundamental institutional flaw ever since it was introduced. 
With the European Commission, responsibility for final decision-making lies with a primarily 
political  body  whose  members  are  particularly  exposed  to  influence  from  firms  and  from 
(governments  of)  the  EU  member  states  (e. g.  Kartte 1992).  On  the  one  hand,  firms  can 
deliberately  seek  to  influence  antitrust  proceedings  at  the  expense  of  their  competitors 
(Baumol/Ordover 1985).  One  possibility  is  the  prevention  of  mergers  between  competitors 
which would have led to competition-relevant efficiency benefits being realised. This constitutes 
a form of rent-seeking which, if successful, results in Type II errors in the sense of the "error 
cost approach". On the other hand, political influence can be exerted, especially by national 
35 On the other hand, they might, for income or career reasons, have an interest in keeping the proceedings as 
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governments,  aimed  at  securing  approval  for  certain  mergers  despite  reservations  about  the 
effects on competition. Under the banner of "industrial policy", there is an interest in building 
"champions"  for  the  global  markets  or  securing  special  treatment  for  sensitive  industries 
(Donges 1994; Krüger 1998; German Monopolies Commission 2005, Nos. 1ff.). However, by 
and  large,  there  are  no  sound  theoretical  arguments  to  justify  this.  Moreover,  the  empirical 
experience is mostly negative. Consequently, approvals granted in exceptional cases for industry 
policy reasons are false decisions of Type I (Christiansen/Kerber 2005, pp. 15f.). Hence, in both 
cases, there is the risk of welfare losses, which are highly relevant to the discussion of the "more 
economic approach". 
Indeed,  especially  in  the  first  years  after  EU  merger  control  was  introduced,  there  were  a 
number of, in competition policy respects, questionable decisions in which influence of this kind 
played a role. For instance, in connection with the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas case
36 it was 
believed  that  the  Airbus  consortium  exerted  influence  on  the  Commission 
(Boeder/Dorman 2000). In the Kali&Salz/MdK/Treuhand case
37, on the other hand, there was 
massive  intervention  by  the  German  government,  while  in  the  Mannesmann/Vallourec/Ilva 
case
38  the  commissioners  themselves  were  divided  (Schmidt 1999,  pp. 438ff.).  A  sensible 
institutional  solution  to  this  problem  would  be,  in  the  first  place,  to  create  an  independent 
antitrust authority at the European level which would have sole responsibility for protecting 
competition and could build up an appropriate reputation. However, proposals to this effect met 
with massive resistance and have receded more and more into the background. In the present 
reform  discussion  this  fundamental  institutional  aspect  is  receiving  little  or  no  attention. 
Admittedly, political factors have been found to play a lesser role in recent years (Mische 2002; 
Pons/Sautter 2004, p. 48). But this does not suggest by any means that it is no longer an issue. 
Rather, there are two further points which need to be considered. 
Firstly, the increased focus on economic analysis can be interpreted as an attempt on the part of 
the  (quite  numerous)  supporters  of  a  purely  competition-oriented  approach  within  the 
Competition Directorate General
39 to shield themselves from attempts to exert external political 
influence. The greater complexity of the economic argumentation de facto already before the 
reform has doubtlessly been a contributing factor (Levy 2003). In so far the "more economic 
36 Case No IV/M.877 - Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, in: Official Journal L 336, 08/12/1997, pp. 16-47.
37 Case No IV/M.308 – Kali&Salz/MdK/Treuhand, in: Official Journal L 186, 21/07/1994, pp. 38-56.
38 Case No IV/M.315 - Mannesmann/Vallourec/Ilva, in: Official Journal L 102, 21/04/1994, pp. 15 -37.
39 Besides the prominent commissioners Brittan, van Miert and Monti, and Directors-General such as Schaub or 
Lowe, this doubtlessly also includes the majority of the officials at the Directorate-General for Competition.A. Christiansen The more economic approach in EU merger control 20
approach"  would  be  a  logical  refinement  of  a  strategy  which  was  already  being  pursued 
(similarly  Kolasky 2002).  However,  this  connection  can  only  be  surmised  since  there  is  no 
explicit  confirmation  by  Commission  representatives  to  be  found.  All  the  same,  ex-
Commissioner Monti (2004a, b) frequently stressed that, with the reform, merger control should 
become  more  transparent  and  "fully  compatible  with  economic  learning".  Consideration  for 
industrial policy or other non-competitive factors would be in no way  compatible. Another, 
more recent indication is also the appointment of Chief Economist Röller who, in his earlier 
publications,  dealt  critically  with  political-economic  aspects  of  merger  control 
(Stevenson/Filippi 2004). This aim of the "more economic approach" would be welcome. But, 
one should add, it is a "second best" solution. To reduce political influence there are better 
institutional  solutions  which  avoid  some  of  the  problems  discussed  here  (Baum 1982; 
Christiansen/Kerber 2005,  pp. 15ff.).  Besides  the  independence  of  the  competition  authority, 
this includes the stronger orientation of merger control to more general rules so as to reduce the 
room for discretionary decisions and thus the exposure to influence. This could also quash the 
contention that in its more recent decisions, as in the GE/Honeywell merger for instance, the 
European  Commission  is  allowing  itself  to  be  influenced  by  an  underlying  anti-American 
sentiment – and thus again by non-competitive factors (Murray 2004, pp. 17ff.).
Secondly, the fact that political intervention has been successfully pushed back in recent years 
does not imply that the problem has been resolved once and for all. Rather, it has to be assumed 
that the inclination towards anti-competitive intervention at the political level will continue to 
exist, at least latently. This was clearly indicated by the (in the end unsuccessful) initiative on 
the  part  of  France  and  Germany  for  a  pan-European  industry  policy  in  autumn  2004 
(Murray 2004, pp. 7ff.). And, while on the subject of Germany, one only needs to recall the 
special  ministerial  powers  exercised  in  the  E.ON/Ruhrgas  case  or  the  present  debate  over 
Springer-Verlag's acquisition of Pro Sieben Sat.1 (Roth/Voigtländer 2002; anon. 2005). So, for 
this reason, too, there is still a need to give thought to institutional safeguards to shield the EU 
merger control process from (industry policy-related) political influence. At the same time, the 
increasing  orientation  towards  case-by-case  analysis  within  the  framework  of  the  "more 
economic  approach"  also  creates  new  possibilities  for  discretionary  decisions.  Given  this 
ambiguity the incentives for firms and politicians to exert influence could be increased again 
(Baumol/Ordover 1985, pp. 254f.). That this aspect has gone largely unnoticed to date points 
once more to an overly narrow focus of the discussions on the new approach. A. Christiansen The more economic approach in EU merger control 21
3.3 Concentration of functions at the European Commission
Another important criticism with regard to the institutional framework of EU merger control 
concerns the concentration of functions, firstly, at the Commission and, secondly, within the 
Commission (Lyons 2004, pp. 254f.; Voigt/Schmidt 2005, pp. 166ff.). Often, the opening of the 
proceedings,  the  investigations,  the  initiation  of  an  in-depth  analysis,  the  hearings  and  the 
preparation  of  the  decision  lie  in  the  hands  of  the  same  case  team  within  the  Competition 
Directorate  General.  Including  the  panel  of  commissioners  which  takes  the  decision,  this 
function, too, is concentrated at the Commission. The only external controls lie with the Court 
of First Instance and the European Court of Justice, to which only isolated cases are referred and 
which have the drawback that the proceedings take a long time. The institutional foundations for 
effective control (checks and balances) are therefore inadequate. This in turn detracts from the 
due diligence of the investigations and the quality and transparency of the decisions, as the three 
EU prohibitions reversed in 2002 exemplified. The relevance of such institutional factors has 
also been demonstrated with reference to US competition policy (Coate/Kleit 1998).
This  criticism  suggests  the  need  for  a  separation  of  the  functions,  for  the  concrete 
implementation of which various models have already been put forward (Murray 2004, pp. 44f.; 
Neven et al. 1993, pp. 231ff.). Firstly, the stages from the opening of the proceedings to the 
hearings with the firms could be assigned to an independent institution, while the European 
Commission would be responsible for the final review of the case and the ultimate decision. In 
practice, this proposal would mean the institutional separation of the Competition Directorate 
General from the European Commission. Secondly, the said functions could remain within the 
purview of the Commission, while the final decision is transferred to an independent judge. In 
both cases, the concentration of the functions within the Commission would be removed. If 
suitably structured, this could at the same time curtail the possibilities for political influence 
discussed in the previous section. There are other proposals such as the separate publication of 
the economic analysis or analyses on the cases or the creation of an independent supervisory 
body on the lines of the German Monopolies Commission whose publications should assure 
transparency and compliance with quality standards. Neither of these is sufficient on its own but 
they are meaningful supplements.
Compared  with  this,  the  changes  in  the  course  of  the  reform  so  far  do  not  go  far  enough 
(Lyons 2004, pp. 257f.; Pons/Sautter 2004, pp. 54ff.). Firstly, of late, more complex cases have 
been reviewed internally by Commission officers within the framework of a so-called "Peer 
Review Panel". The Chief Economist and his team are also involved in the decision-making 
process.  On  conceptual  issues  there  is  also  a  greater  exchange  with  academic  experts,  for A. Christiansen The more economic approach in EU merger control 22
instance within the framework of the new EAGCP Advisory Group. Secondly, the Court of First 
Instance has introduced a fast-track procedure which allows a more effective judicial review of 
the Commission's decisions. While, on the whole, these changes point in the right direction, they 
are only partially institutionalised and therefore still do not go far enough. The conclusion is 
therefore the same as on the question of political influence. The need for institutional reforms 
remains,  and  can  re-emerge  the  next  time  a  controversial  case  arises.  Therefore,  the  "more 
economic approach" should be broadened in this respect, too, and consideration be given to the
appropriate economics-based proposals for an improved institutional framework.
4. Summary and conclusion
A "more economic approach" in EU merger control is an aim that is to be welcomed. However, 
the path pursued so far by the European Commission appears too one-sided. Contrary to the 
original  aim,  it  was  found  that,  in  fact,  it  leads  to  less  legal  certainty  and  increases  the 
(administrative) burden, while the impact on decision quality is still open, to say the least. Clear 
deficiencies were found with regard to the institutional framework. The increasing involvement 
of economic experts, for instance, raises a number of problems which have not been considered 
to date. The same holds for the continued possibility  for  (industrial policy-related) political 
influence and rent-seeking as well as the absence of an institutional separation of the functions 
in  the  merger  control  process.  This  calls  for  a  broader  perception  of  an  economics-based 
approach which systematically takes account of the effects on decision-making practice and the 
institutional implications as well. From this perspective the establishment of an independent 
competition authority and the stronger orientation of merger control to (more) general rules 
appear suitable courses of action. Only on this basis is the application of the new approach to 
broader areas of German and EC competition policy to be recommended. A. Christiansen The more economic approach in EU merger control 23
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